Is there any justification for academic social science? by Hammersley, Martyn
Is there any justification for academic social science?
blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2016/06/14/is-there-any-justification-for-academic-social-science/
The role of academic social science in relation to policymaking and practice has seen extensive
discussion and disagreement in recent years. An essential starting point for our understanding,
argues Martyn Hammersley, is to distinguish among the different types of social research,
especially between academic work and more practical forms of inquiry. We need to start
presenting a more realistic justification for our work, and for why it warrants public funding.  But
we must also be clear that the indirect and elusive character of social science’s contribution does
not mean that it is meagre or insignificant.
In his recent book about the ESRC, David Walker laments the fact that the original vision of its
early directors, notably Michael Young and Andrew Shonfield, has not been realised: for them its task was to fund
interdisciplinary research that would feed directly into policymaking, and thereby have a significant impact on
society. The main, though not the only, villains of the piece in Walker’s history are academics. He claims that they
hijacked the organisation in order to fund their own research. As this suggests, he rejects the idea of academic
autonomy, and sees very little value in social science which does not produce findings that are actionable and have
‘impact’.
His account oversimplifies, relies to a considerable extent on anecdote (‘I recall a conversation with [Geoff Mulgan]
inside Number 10, sitting on a chintz sofa’), and caricatures the views of those who disagree with him, including me.
But, putting all this on one side, his discussion does raise very important issues: what role social science can and
should play in relation to national policymaking, and to organisational or occupational practice more generally;
whether there is any connection between the quality of research evidence and the influence it has; in what sense if
any its results are cumulative; and whether interdisciplinarity is viable. In my view, he is certainly correct that
exaggerated claims have been made for the contribution that social science has made to policymaking, but he is
wrong to underplay its actual contribution by contrasting it with a utopian ideal. He is also wrong to deny the value of
academic autonomy, since this is essential for the productive pursuit of some kinds of knowledge (Hammersley
2016).
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Here I want to use Walker’s book as a prompt to explore the justification for academic social science, in a way that
is more realistic than the exaggerated claims for its major role in practical decision-making that he rightly
challenges. However, this is no easy task in the present climate of opinion, dominated as it is by the kind of
economistic instrumentalism on which Walker’s critique itself relies: for example, he repeatedly asks what the
demonstrable impact of social science has been in financial terms.
One of the failings of much discussion about the role of social research in relation to policymaking and practice is
that, each time there is a crisis in this relationship, discussion effectively starts again from scratch, and goes over
much the same ground, rather than building on previous understanding. So, for example, many years ago a
distinction was drawn between two rather different ways of conceptualising the relationship between research and
practice: the engineering and the enlightenment models (Bulmer 1982). The first assumes that research can feed
directly into action, while the second treats it as shaping perspectives in broader terms, or serving as a resource
that can be used, along with others, to make practical decisions. While each of these models has been interpreted in
different ways, the literature dealing with them provides a much richer understanding of the various roles research
can play than the narrow, intellectually corrosive instrumentalism that currently prevails (Hammersley 2002).
An essential starting point, then, is to distinguish among different types of social research, especially between
academic work and more practical forms of inquiry, such as that contracted by government departments or carried
out by commercial research organisations, including pollsters. The former is concerned with contributing to
cumulative bodies of knowledge about perennial issues, from financial crises to urban riots, healthcare provision to
immigration. By contrast, practical social research is aimed at supplying specific information needed for current
decision-making, and doing so as far as possible at the time required. It is important to emphasise that both these
kinds of research are of value, and indeed that they each stimulate and feed off the other. But they are very different
in character, and involve significantly different requirements.
At one time, there was a broad consensus that the function of the SSRC/ESRC was to fund academic research,
while practical research would be financed directly by government departments and by other organisations in need
of the information to be supplied. However, increasingly, there has been pressure on the ESRC to shift its emphasis
towards practical research that has direct impact through being taken up by users. Walker’s complaint is that this
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pressure has not had the desired effect, but he does not stop to consider whether there may be reasons for this, he
simply assigns blame. The parallel history of the Institute of Community Studies, which Michael Young founded, may
provide some pointers, since there a shift occurred from research aimed directly at shaping policies towards an
approach that was closer to the enlightenment model (Wilmott 1985).
An instrumental justification can, of course, be provided for academic social science, not just as providing
information and ideas that may be taken up by policymakers and practitioners (in terms of the enlightenment model)
but also through its contribution to practical social research, and through university courses that educate future
policymakers and practitioners, and their publics. This justification stands despite the ‘payoff’ of social science, in all
these ways, being indirect and difficult to measure, or even hard to detect; as various studies of the role of research
in relation to policymaking have shown (see, especially, Weiss 1980). Against the kind of narrow instrumentalism
that now prevails, it must be insisted that the indirect and elusive character of social science’s contribution does not
mean that it is meagre or insignificant. This false conclusion derives from what might be thought of as a modernist
fallacy: that everything important is observable and measurable; and indeed that all state funding is investment on
which there must be a calculable return. A vital contribution that social scientists could make to public discourse at
the present time is to challenge this conventional wisdom.
It is necessary, then, to emphasise the instrumental value of academic social science and to resist attempts to limit
such value to what can be measured. Equally important, though, there is a non-instrumental justification for
academic social science that must be recognised and championed. This relies on the argument that there is value in
human beings knowing about and reflecting on their social lives, and that academic social science facilitates this by
providing both empirical information and theoretical ideas. Of course, it is particularly difficult to make the case for
this role in the current climate, but it is nevertheless important to do so. Otherwise an emaciated conception of what
is of value in human life is promoted. Moreover, the task here begins within the research community, since there are
many social scientists who themselves seem to believe that all value is instrumental, for example that worthwhile
research must provide a critique of some aspect of current social and political arrangements or bring about change,
indeed that otherwise it is pointless or even of negative value. This is not only a form of instrumentalism – the
assumption that all value is instrumental – it is one that encourages social scientists to abuse their limited
intellectual authority by falsely claiming expertise in making value judgments about the phenomena they study;
when their expertise is limited to producing certain types of factual information that are more reliable than those from
other sources.
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This task may be a modest one, but it is nevertheless important, and by no means easy.
Walker’s book should serve as a warning to academic social scientists: in effect, it is the writing on the wall. His
message is that excessive claims about the direct and immediate relevance or impact of social science are no
longer believable. Such claims have been central to the pitches made by the ESRC and by the Academy of Social
Sciences, notably in the Campaign for Social Science (Hammersley 2015), as well as by many individual social
scientists in promoting their own work. We need to start presenting a more realistic justification for our work, and for
why it warrants public funding. While it may be very difficult to get this accepted, the task is nevertheless essential.
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